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Abstract
Malware authors have always been at an advantage of being able to adversarially
test and augment their malicious code, before deploying the payload, using anti-
malware products at their disposal. The anti-malware developers and threat experts,
on the other hand, do not have such a privilege of tuning anti-malware products
against zero-day attacks pro-actively. This allows the malware authors to being a
step ahead of the anti-malware products, fundamentally biasing the cat and mouse
game played by the two parties. In this paper, we propose a way that would enable
machine learning based threat prevention models to bridge that gap by being able to
tune against a deep generative adversarial network (GAN), which takes up the role
of a malware author and generates new types of malware. The GAN is trained over
a reversible distributed RGB image representation of known malware behaviors,
encoding the sequence of API call ngrams and the corresponding term frequencies.
The generated images represent synthetic malware that can be decoded back to
the underlying API call sequence information. The image representation is not
only demonstrated as a general technique of incorporating necessary priors for
exploiting convolutional neural network architectures for generative or discrimi-
native modeling, but also as a visualization method for easy manual software or
malware categorization, by having individual API ngram information distributed
across the image space. In addition, we also propose using smart-definitions for
detecting malwares based on perceptual hashing of these images. Such hashes
are potentially more effective than cryptographic hashes that do not carry any
meaningful similarity metric, and hence, do not generalize well.
1 Introduction
With the growing influence of connectivity and machine intelligence in our day-to-day life, ranging
from the use of smart personal assistants like Google Assistant, to peer-to-peer connected smart
cars and IoT devices, the threat landscape has become more diverse with increasing repercussions.
A successful breach can range from loosing of confidential data, loss of customers, to fatalities or
even death. So, it is not enough to be retroactive in protection. The existing anti-malware products
mostly depend on highly specific malware-definitions based on cryptographic hashing algorithms.
They use SHA256, as an example, for fingerprinting new malicious samples. However such samples
reach the vendor’s servers for analysis, only after some hours or days of it being first detected on
a device. Most of the harm might have already been done by the time the anti-malware vendor
gets the file for analysis. Instead, it is now important that the approach to stop malware must be
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increasingly proactive, where the anti-malware product constantly creates new malware behavior “by
itself”, intelligently, and discovers unknown security holes in a system even before they get exploited
by a breach. Such an automated way for creation of well-defined malware programs with unique
behaviors, which would be as good as the programs created by humans, is a difficult problem that
not only involves modeling the logic, but also the semantics and the grammar of a programming
language. We demonstrate, however, that if the malware behaviors can be approximately encoded into
a representation, such as the image representation we propose, and given that, existing state-of-the-art
generative models like GANs can train on them, then, one can sample representations of new malware
behavior from the trained generator network, emulating a malware author.
One of the key reasons for the success of deep learning technologies, in addition to the availability
of better computational power at lower costs, has been the vast scope and research in architectural
engineering that constantly improved the training process and effective modeling of the priors of
the problem. For example, for improving the training, the Residual Block architecture [1] with its
skip-like additive connections, ensures that each subsequent layer is at least as good as the previous,
thereby, addressing the gradient-vanishing problem in deeper networks. More tricks such as dropouts,
non-saturating activation functions such as ReLU, first successfully demonstrated by Krizhevsky
et al. [4], help in stabilizing the training process and improving generalization. An example of the
architectural modifications to improve modeling the priors of a given problem, involves the idea
of weight-sharing, for instance, within the convolution operation [2, 3] on image datasets. The
weights per filter map are shared across an image to allow activation by similar localized features,
and, therefore, provide translational invariance of the prediction against the semantic content of the
input. Similarly, weight-sharing across time, engineered in recurrent neural networks, enables better
generalization for inputs involving sequential data of arbitrary lengths. Further, data-augmentation
methods [4], transformer networks [5], amongst others, are examples of architectural improvements
for inputs with invariance requirements involving more general Affine transformations, including,
rotation. Another important work on data-driven architectural engineering includes modeling CNNs
over datasets intrinsically structured as graphs. Since a graph is defined by the vertices and the local
connections, such systems require invariance of the prediction under graph isomorphism, in place
of translation. For example, Duvenaud et al. [7] proposed CNNs over molecules with convolutions
applied locally (locality defined by edges) after modeling each atom as a node in a graph of arbitrary
size and shape, predicting specific chemical properties of the molecules with a great accuracy.
Advances in the architectures have also involved intuition borrowed from other research fields. The
recent capsule-based network architecture from Sabour et al. [6], for example, focuses on preserving
the relative pose information of the visual entities in an image, by using units called “capsules”,
which encapsulate various relative spacial information of a feature in the form of a vector, as opposed
to scalar outputs from pooling neurons, drawing references from psychology and computer graphics.
In contrast, there have not been such tailored end-to-end data-driven learning models on executables,
understanding their behavior, till date. This could majorly be attributed to the difficulty of engineering
the architectural modifications in a neural network, that would efficiently capture the priors of the
executables appropriately. Unlike the case of images where the required invariances (like translation)
are common to the entire data, for executables, the invariance of the bytes per say, varies with each file
based on programmer logic and the optimizations that the compiler makes. For instance, a particular
chunk of bytes in a file might represent a function definition that could be invoked from some other
chunk of bytes. In such a case, it makes sense to require “translational” invariance of the overall
behaviour (malicious or benign) with respect to those bytes defining the function. Since different
files could have such byte chunks representing the same function definition, at different offsets, and
have a non-linear ordering of instructions at run-time with the programmatic constructs such as loops,
jumps, etc., it becomes very hard for existing deep learning models to generalize well from such data.
Some attempts towards this direction involve a couple of recent works from nVIDIA [8] and Microsoft
Research [9]. The former work implements a 1D ConvNet directly over the raw file binaries, which
they refer to as MalConvNet, as a way of overcoming the memory decay in RNNs over long sequences,
while the later one, models the programming constructs as graphs, building on the ideas of Duvenaud
et al. [7]. But the efficacy of these models are far from what one expects to achieve when compared to
the performance of deep learning models in other applications. Theoretically, predicting the behavior
of files in arbitrary environments with static analysis of the raw binaries, is limited, due to the Halting
problem that is NP-hard for an optimal solution. Though this might not be restrictive for a practical
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(as opposed to optimal) end-to-end deep learning framework, it adds to the complexity of modeling
over the raw bytes.
Therefore, we propose taking a dynamic analysis approach in examining the file executables, that
involves monitoring the program execution on a target environment as a sequence of the low-level
API calls, which determines its overall high-level behavior. In contrast to static analysis, this approach
is resistant to any obfuscation of the payload by methods, such as, encryption of the corresponding
raw bytes, which is generally the case with advanced malwares.
In this paper, we propose a general method for visualizing a sequence of words (events or API calls)
in the form of an image that is visually distinctive, where each pixel partly encodes the overall
behavior of an execution sequence, losslessly. The image representation proposed incorporates
the necessary priors required for exploiting the convolutional neural network architectures in the
generative (e.g. GANs) and the discriminative (e.g. deep CNN-based malware classifiers) regimes.
Moreover, it is also shown to be an effective visualization technique for easy manual software or
malware categorization in Section 3. Additionally, we also demonstrate how a deep Wasserstein
GAN model with gradient penalty [13], referred to as WGAN-GP, can be trained over the proposed
image representation of the malicious file behaviors, to assume the role of a malware author and
generate new malicious behavioral-sequences; interpolating, extrapolating or even combining the
behavioral features of known malwares. Such new unseen malwares can then be used to test and
enhance (behavioral) signature based anti-malware solutions proactively.
An earlier work by Hu et al. [12] highlights an application of GANs in evading detection by generating
adversarial inputs that fool existing machine learning based protection on clients. But for such an
application to be practical, the malware authors must possess precise information on the features used
by the classifier, which is generally kept confidential by the security vendor. It is hard for a malware
author to figure out the features used, as the possible combinations (e.g. ngrams of the API calls
for arbitrary n) to try out is huge. We, on the other hand, exploit GANs as malware emulators for
training or testing malware classifiers against the generated malwares for proactive protection.
The rest of the paper is organized as sections in the following order:
• Mapping file behaviors to RGB images.
• Applications on Software/Malware Categorization and Smart-Definitions.
• Simple Malware Classifier trained on the behavior-mapped RGB images.
• Modeling Malware Behaviors with Generative Adversarial Networks.
Finally, we conclude by discussing on future directions, and possible improvements over the initial
implementation presented†.
2 Mapping file behaviors to RGB Images
The primary behavioral information obtained from an execution log, consists of the API (event or
call) ngrams, their frequencies, and the sequence of their occurrences. For visualizing the executions,
one would want to map this information to the pixel intensities of an image representation, that would
allow easy manual categorization, and enable applying deep convolutional neural network-based
architectures across generative and discriminative models. A trivial way of mapping such information
into an image domain, might involve encoding the individual ngram words with pixel positions, and
the tf-idfs of those words as their intensities. Such a image representation is local where a pixel
corresponds to only a single feature of the behavioral trace, i.e., a single API call ngram.
We propose a distributed image representation, rather than a local one, where each feature corre-
sponding to a distinct ngram partly contributes to the intensity values across all the pixels of the
image.
Some considerations that motivate a distributed image representation include:
1. Being able to observe a significant difference and a certain similarity between two different
executable files sharing a common sub-set of API calls but having a different overall behavior.
†References to the code, training parameters, dataset of files used, and the full resolution PNG figures are
available at https://github.com/bsvineethiitg/malwaregan.
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This suggests that the individual API call features must be distributed across pixels, since
our visual system is more sensitive to the overall texture of the image rather than tracking
specific pixels. Also, since the tf-idf (of API calls or call sequences) features are generally
sparse, any local representation would be very hard to visualize, as the bright pixels would
also be sparse, with most of the image being dark.
2. Encapsulating a long-range inter-dependence of the API calls across the execution, rather
than just being limited by the ngrams (of API calls), such that, for example, each pixel
intensity or a texture formed in the overall image representation is determined by every
ngram – no matter how much they are separated in the sequence of calls.
3. Being able to apply existing deep learning techniques which work efficiently on publicly
available image datasets. This requires that the priors inherently assumed of the data, by such
models, remain still valid. For instance, models designed for classification tasks involving
regular images assume the requirement of translational invariance of the predictions with
respect to the semantic content, i.e., for example, a picture of an object of interest in a scene
translated to a different location should still be classified as the same object. Under a local
image representation of the file behavior, where a pixel position corresponds to an unique
API call ngram, a convolutional filter map may get activated by similar pattern of pixel
intensities across different parts of an image under translation. This would lead to different
behaviors getting similar activations, as positions encode unique sets of the API call ngrams
in a local representation. Hence, for published image-based deep learning architectures
to work, an image representation needs to have uniquely identifiable patterns for different
events, across the image space.
To achieve the above considerations, we exploit Fourier transform, in encoding the behavioral
information into distributed image textures by mapping the frequency space with the individual API
call ngram information. We elaborate the methodology of generating the image representations from
the file behavior subsequently, after defining our notation for the Fourier Transform.
The Fourier Transform, I˜ = DFT{I}, over a single-channel real-valued Image I of size n × n is
defined by
I˜[i][j] =
1
n2
n−1∑
a=0
n−1∑
b=0
I[a][b] e−ι2pi(
ia
n +
jb
n ), (1)
where the indexing notation [p][q] refers to the value at the pth row and qth column. Note that ι
above represents
√−1. The Fourier transform of the image, I˜ , is a complex-valued n× n matrix,
and therefore can be decomposed into the real and the imaginary parts, or equivalently, the amplitude
and the phase parts, as illustrated below:
I˜[i][j] ≡ A[i][j] eιP[i][j], (2)
where A and P represent real-valued n× n sized matrices corresponding to the amplitude and the
phase respectively with A[i][j] ≥ 0 and P[i][j] ∈ [0, 2pi). This operation can be implemented (per
channel) using the OpenCV 2 package for Python with a few lines of code as follows:
amplitude, phase = cv2.cartToPolar(cv2.dft(numpy.float64(image),
flags=cv2.DFT_SCALE | cv2.DFT_COMPLEX_OUTPUT),
angleInDegrees=True)
A location in the frequency space after DFT, corresponds to a periodic texture with a unique frequency
and orientation (refer to the DFT basis images, as an example, in Figure 1) in the position space,
distributed across the pixels. We, therefore, encode the API call ngram words to the locations in the
frequency space, with their tf-idfs determining the amplitudes in the amplitude spectrum A. The
phase spectrum P is exploited to encode the relative ranks of the API call ngrams in the order of their
first-invocation. This is repeated across the three channels (R, G, B) independently corresponding
to the 4-grams, 3-grams, and 1,2-grams, respectively. Finally, a distributed image representation is
obtained by applying an inverse DFT (IDFT), given the amplitude and the phase spectra, defined over
a single-channel matrix I˜ (with I˜[i][j] ≡ A[i][j] eιP[i][j]) of size n× n by
I[a][b] =
n−1∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=0
I˜[i][j] eι2pi(
ia
n +
jb
n ) =
n−1∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=0
A[i][j] eι2pi( ian + jbn )+ιP[i][j]. (3)
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Clearly, each pixel intensity in the position space depends on all the individual API call ngram
features in the frequency space as evident from the above Eq. (3). This can be implemented (per
channel) using OpenCV 2 as:
image = cv2.magnitude(cv2.idft(cv2.polarToCart(amplitude, phase,
angleInDegrees=True), flags=cv2.DFT_COMPLEX_OUTPUT))
When visualizing the file behavior as a RGB image by this method, not only do we have the API
information per channel distributed across the image, forming textures, but also, the information
across the channels are intermixing, to give a rich color palette and unique patterns, to the final image
for easy manual inspection and categorization as subsequently shown in Section 3.
Since the Fourier transform is reversible, one may also decode back the original API call ngrams
with their first-invocation ranks and the term-frequencies, from the image representations losslessly.
We outline the algorithm for the image generation after describing the dataset below.
2.1 Dataset
Our dataset consisted of API call sequence logs over 1, 984 distinct API functions, from a total of
12, 006 distinct PE (.EXE) files executed through RunningWater. RunningWater is a proprietary
software from Symantec, for dynamic malware analysis, that hooks itself into the running process,
capturing the API call events. The samples are executed on a VM, running Windows, on a single-core.
The environment is restored back after each run, to avoid any interference across the samples. The
sample binaries, for our research, have been downloaded partly from the VirusTotal portal and partly
from Symantec’s own datastores. An example output of event sequence from RunningWater on
execution of a file is as follows (ordered by the timestamp of invocation across threads)
· · ·
event(1501696951,8644,3120,api_GetEnvironmentVariable(_))
event(1501696951,8644,3120,api_GetEnvironmentVariable(_))
event(1501696951,8644,3120,api_RegQueryInfoKey(21900,0,0,_,5,9,0,0,0,0,0,0,0))
event(1501696951,8644,3120,api_RegEnumKeyEx(21900,4,’v4.0’,4,_,0,0,[3647740521,30361877]))
· · ·
with the format: event(timestamp, process_id, thread_id, api_name(args)). The run
time per sample is capped at 2 minutes with sleep times (if any) limited to 1 second. The average
number of events across our dataset was about 40,000 per file execution.
In this work, we only consider the API calls as words, leaving out the arguments. One of the
reasons being that, malwares, generally, tend to randomize the arguments wherever possible to evade
string-based or hash-based static signatures. Therefore, from the above shown example, we only
consider the following effective sequence when modeling a document representing the file behavior:
· · ·
GetEnvironmentVariable
GetEnvironmentVariable
RegQueryInfoKey
RegEnumKeyEx
· · ·
We reserve including arguments and loaded DLL information into the sequence, for future work. To
assign labels (malicious or clean), we used Symantec’s reputation service. Our final labeled dataset
consisted of 1, 662 clean, 2, 512 malicious, and 7, 832 grayware (low confidence in assigning either
label) files.
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2.2 Image Generation
The image representation of the API call sequence log is generated by an inverse DFT of the
frequency space, where the tf-idfs of event ngrams (n=1 or 2, 3, and 4, mapped to the B, G, R
channels, respectively) are encoded as the amplitude of a frequency component, and the relative
first-occurrence order of an event is preserved in the phase information. Here, we describe the
algorithm for generating 64 × 64 × 3 image representation from behaviors, that may be trivially
extended to the general case of n× n× 3 dimensions.
1. Each API call sequence log, out of a total 12,006 (clean+malware+grayware) file execu-
tion logs, is modeled as a document of words representing the sequence of the API call
invocations per file execution.
2. Based on this corpus of documents, a vocabulary consisting of 1, 2, 3, and 4-grams is built
using the scikit-learn’s [14] TfidfVectorizer method as follows.
sklearn.feature_extraction.text.TfidfVectorizer(analyzer="word",
max_df=0.98,
min_df=1,
ngram_range=(1, 4),
norm=None,
use_idf=True,
smooth_idf=True,
sublinear_tf=True)
By having max_df=0.98, we ignore the terms that occur in over 98% of the documents
considering them similar to stop words. No normalization was used to prevent the sup-
pression of tf-idf terms across the (1,2)-grams, 3-grams, and 4-grams, as they are treated
independently while mapping to the B, G, R channels of the image, respectively. Finally, the
sublinear term-frequency [15], generally defined as 1 + log(tf) where tf is the non-zero
term-frequency, was used in order to weigh down the effect of highly repetitive API call
words as it is unlikely that twenty occurrences of a term in a document truly carries twenty
times the significance of a single occurrence. Moreover, this also helps, upto some extent,
against good-API call spamming, a trick generally used by the malware authors to evade
detection. The log nonlinearity also helps in bringing the tf-idf features across documents to
a comparable numerical range without skew.
The vectorizer is fit over the corpus and transformed to generate the tf-idf vector representa-
tions for the documents in the corpus, before persisting it on disk for future use - during the
prediction/evaluation phase. The vocabulary consisted of 876 unigrams, 61,052 bigrams,
365,388 trigrams, and 840,990 quadgrams after fitting it over our dataset.
3. Since an image is finite in size (in this case, 64 × 64 × 3), only a limited number of the
ngrams may be encoded. Therefore, we choose only the top 64× 64 = 4096 ngrams per
channel that correlate the most with the ground-truth labels (clean or malicious) based on
a holdout set. To prevent any leakage of the label information, we randomly choose 250
samples each out of a total 1,662 clean and 2,512 malicious samples, respectively, as holdout
sets for calculating the significance of the ngrams, with the below definition, that intuitively
represents the ratio of the inter-class distance to the intra-class deviation.
significance(i) =
∣∣∣∣µi1 − µi0σi1 + σi0
∣∣∣∣ (4)
Here, µij and σ
i
j respectively represent the average/mean and the standard deviation of the
tf-idf values corresponding to the ngram represented by i, among the samples belonging to
the class j (j =1 for malicious, 0 for clean).
The top 20 ngrams across channels with the highest significance measure were as shown in
the Table 1.
4. Top n × n (here 64 × 64 = 4096) ngrams for each of the three independent channels,
i.e., 61,928 1,2-grams, 365,388 3-grams, and 840,990 4-grams, are picked based on the
significance measure defined in Eq. (4) calculated over the holdout set of 500 images (250
clean, and 250 malicious) as described above. These 500 images are completely removed
from the dataset to prevent any information leak biasing our results. The rest of the steps are
performed over the remaining 1,412 clean and 2,262 malicious files.
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Table 1: Top 20 discriminating ngrams with their Inverse Document Frequencies (IDF).
ngram (n=1,2,3,4) Significance IDF
NtClose NtOpenKey NtQueryValueKey NtClose 0.602208 4.317899
ProcessIdToSessionId 0.593848 3.836467
RtlDeleteBoundaryDescriptor 0.571707 4.192736
NtQueryValueKey NtCreateFile 0.524891 4.634343
NtQueryValueKey NtCreateFile NtCreateSection 0.524891 4.634343
NtQueryValueKey NtCreateFile NtCreateSection NtMapViewOfSection 0.524891 4.634343
VirtualAlloc VirtualAlloc VirtualAlloc VirtualProtect 0.513892 2.501540
GetStartupInfo 0.508476 4.421983
NtClose NtQueryValueKey 0.508327 4.283998
NtOpenProcessToken NtQueryInformationToken NtClose NtOpenKey 0.506242 4.643852
NtQueryInformationToken NtClose NtOpenKey NtQueryValueKey 0.500000 4.686135
RtlDeleteBoundaryDescriptor RtlDeleteBoundaryDescriptor 0.497304 4.343512
NtOpenThreadToken 0.491294 4.477043
RtlGetNtProductType RtlDeleteBoundaryDescriptor 0.478606 4.682818
RtlDeleteBoundaryDescriptor RegOpenKeyEx 0.476774 4.669660
QueryPerformanceCounter GetStartupInfo 0.474858 4.603285
GetSystemTimeAsFileTime QueryPerformanceCounter GetStartupInfo 0.474858 4.612502
NtQueryValueKey 0.472702 1.707998
Process32Next 0.469005 3.009256
LoadLibrary ZwQuerySystemInformation 0.466916 2.442038
Figure 1: DFT basis images in the position space corresponding to an amplitude for a single frequency
out of 4×4 = 16 possible frequencies with varying orientation where the top-left pixel represents the
DC component that determines the overall brightness of the image in the position space. The arrows
represent the order of assigning the ngrams based on their significance starting from the bottom-most
arrow.
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Table 2: Top 15 1,2-grams assigned to the positions in the frequency space of the Blue channel of
a 4 × 4 Image. The height h (along the vertical axis) and the width w (along the horizontal axis)
coordinates are measured from the top-left position labeled by (0, 0).
ngram (n=1,2) Significance Position
assigned (h,w)
ProcessIdToSessionId 0.593848 (3, 0)
RtlDeleteBoundaryDescriptor 0.571707 (3, 1)
NtQueryValueKey NtCreateFile 0.524891 (3, 2)
GetStartupInfo 0.508476 (3, 3)
NtClose NtQueryValueKey 0.508327 (2, 3)
RtlDeleteBoundaryDescriptor RtlDeleteBoundaryDescriptor 0.497304 (1, 3)
NtOpenThreadToken 0.491294 (0, 3)
RtlGetNtProductType RtlDeleteBoundaryDescriptor 0.478606 (2, 0)
RtlDeleteBoundaryDescriptor RegOpenKeyEx 0.476774 (2, 1)
QueryPerformanceCounter GetStartupInfo 0.474858 (2, 2)
NtQueryValueKey 0.472702 (1, 2)
Process32Next 0.469005 (0, 2)
LoadLibrary ZwQuerySystemInformation 0.466916 (1, 0)
CreateToolhelp32Snapshot 0.461527 (1, 1)
NtOpenKey NtQueryValueKey 0.451770 (0, 1)
DC Component (initialized with a positive value) that gets
scaled on normalizing the contrast – (0, 0)
5. Across each channel, the higher significant ngrams are mapped to positions of higher
frequency as occupied when transforming an image into frequency-space by DFT. This
allows one to model better discriminating features with sharper distinctive edges into the
position-space. This methodology is chosen such that the image representation is visually
differentiable, for manually categorizing files. The lesser discriminative features are assigned
to the lower frequency positions in the Fourier-space of the image, which, effectively, get
modeled as smoother patterns in the position-space image representation. An example of
the DFT basis images for the case of 4× 4 dimensions are shown in Figure 1, along with
a demonstration of the ngram to coordinate mapping (in the frequency-space) in Table 2
for the Blue channel (n=1 or 2). This is repeated similarly for the Red and Green channels,
corresponding to the 4-grams and 3-grams, respectively. The top left-most pixel in the
frequency space corresponds to the DC component, determining the overall brightness of
the image, that gets scaled appropriately on normalizing the contrast per channel (described
subsequently).
6. For each of the ngrams mapped to a position in the frequency space per channel, the
corresponding tf-idf coefficients are encoded as the amplitudes in the polar representation
of the DFT. We denote this by the matrix Aji , given an executable i, across the channels
denoted by j ∈ {R, G, B}.
7. To determine the phase component of the call ngrams mapped to the positions in the
frequency space, the relative first-invocation ranks of the ngrams (i.e., in the sequence of the
ngrams ordered by their first-invocation in the API call log) per channel are computed for
a given executable. That is, considering the R channel, for instance, the relative ranks of
first-invocation are computed among the 4-grams that occurred in the executable. The ranks
assigned per channel are then rescaled to (0, 360], dividing the range into equal intervals, to
encode the phase corresponding to the ngram positions in the frequency space. We denote
this by the matrix Pji for a given executable i across the channels denoted by j ∈ {R, G, B}.
Therefore, the sequence information is not only captured with the tf-idfs of the ngrams
(n>1), but also into the phase of the image, by encoding the relative first-occurrence ranks
among the ngrams per channel.
For the case of the Blue channel consisting of both 1 and 2-grams, the ngram ranks as-
signed among each set are merged in the same order, giving a higher precedence to the
1-grams over the 2-grams in the case of a tie. As an example, consider the sequence
Q, Q, B, P. The ranks for the 1-grams would be 1, 2, 3 corresponding to Q, B, P; while
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Figure 2: An overview of the image encoding scheme
for the 2-grams, the terms QQ, QB, BP would carry the ranks 1, 2, 3, respectively, by our
method. The final ranks are then determined to be 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 for the terms in the or-
der Q, QQ, B, QB, P, BP, respectively. The ranks rescaled to degrees correspond to
60◦, 120◦, 180◦, 240◦, 300◦, 360◦ phases, respectively, with a default value of 0◦ for terms
that do not appear in the execution. Similarly, the phases computed for the Green channel
would be 180◦ and 360◦ corresponding to the 3-grams QQB and QBP, respectively, by the
same procedure.
8. Given the assigned phases and the amplitudes for an executable i, the position space image
for the channel j is computed as
Imageji = ContrastNormalize(IDFT{Aji ,Pji }),
where ContrastNormalize(·) linearly rescales the pixel value range per channel after IDFT
to [0, 255], that fixes the amplitude of the DC component in the frequency space. Finally,
the RGB color image representation of the executable i is obtained by stacking the IDFTs
along the depth as
Imagei = [Image
R
i , Image
G
i , Image
B
i ].
This is stored as a PNG to avoid any loss due to image compressions inherent to alternative
file formats such as the JPEG. Figure 2 provides an illustration of the image encoding
scheme described above.
Figure 3 shows 64 samples of 64× 64 color images generated across the clean and malicious set of
files with the steps described above. Each image visually encodes a total of (4096− 1)× 3 = 12, 285
relative tf-idf coefficients of the ngrams across channels, with the first-invocation order captured
in the phase of the image. The position space image representation corresponds to a weighted (by
tf-idf coefficients) sum of 2D sinusoidal waves at different frequencies, orientations (corresponding
to different ngrams), and phases (corresponding to the first-occurrence order). In addition to this,
the color channels (Blue, Green, or Red) of the image, representing the ngram type, i.e., n = 1 or
2, 3, and 4, combine across the depth, giving rise to a spectrum of composite colors for a rich image
visualization of the file behavior.
2.3 Decoding Images back to Sequence
Since the Fourier Transform is reversible, one can decode back the information encoded into the
images losslessly. The phase of the image at a position in the frequency space can be used to rank
the corresponding ngram word to determine its relative order in the output ngram sequence, and the
amplitude can be used to derive the relative tf-idf value. The IDF coefficients computed for each
ngram word previously, during image generation, can be used to extract the relative (sub-linear)
term-frequencies of the ngrams from their relative tf-idfs (amplitudes). This is summarized in the
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(a) Non-malicious (clean) files (b) Malicious files
Figure 3: Samples of 64× 64 image representation corresponding to 64 distinct files per category
randomly chosen from the dataset. The R, G, B channels represent the 4-gram, 3-gram, and 1,2-
grams respectively of the API call words. The amplitude per pixel after DFT is determined by the
corresponding tf-idf, and the phase by its relative first-occurrence rank among its channel of ngrams.
(Images shown are scaled.)
Figure 4: An overview of the image decoding scheme per channel
Figure 4 for the R channel that corresponds to the 4-grams here. The same procedure may be repeated
for the other channels to decode the tri- and bi/uni- grams respectively. Being able to decode the
images allows interpretability of the decisions made by machine learning classifiers built over the
image representations, helping manual analysis of critical false-positives or false-negatives.
3 Applications on Software/Malware Categorization and Smart-Definitions
The described image representation of a file behavior, summarizes the API content and the sequence
information into the visible artifacts, such as edges at different orientations, their relative intensities,
and the color of the pixels. This enables easy software and malware categorization, manually, by
recognizing the similarities and the differences among the executables, based on the visual patterns.
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Figure 5: Normalized histogram (bin width = 1) of pair-wise Hamming distances based on a 192-bit
perceptual hash, obtained by concatenating the 64-bit dHashes [16] computed per channel, across
254 samples belonging to 21 file categories determined from Symantec’s internal metadata combined
with VirusTotal based on file paths, virus names, etc., in-field across clients.
Quick manual malware analysis is critical, especially, for zero-day outbreaks, such as the recent
WannaCry attack, to reduce the damaging impact. For such cases, the image representation described,
may accelerate the analysis through easy visual comparison with other known malwares. Attribution
to related malwares, for instance, can help in faster remediation. It also offers the flexibility of using
color filters (Red/Green/Blue) for comparing patterns channel-wise, or even applying band-pass filter
operations instead, to only compare the patterns formed by a particular set of ngrams across the given
samples.
Categorization may also be easily automated using general image similarity methods and clustering
techniques. Since the images have highly ordered structure, unlike the pictures of objects or a scene
in real-life, simple distance metrics, such as the pixel-wise Euclidean distance, may be employed
for clustering the files into categories. Other methods that summarize the perceptual information
or the semantic content of the image (for instance, based on the pre-final layers of a trained deep
convolutional neural network) may also be used for image similarity and clustering.
Perceptual hashing techniques (such as the dHash [16], and pHash [17]) applied over the image
representation, have an advantage in generalizing well across variants of files with similar behavior, in
contrast to the cryptographic hashes (like the SHA256) that are more commonly used for fingerprinting
files as anti-malware definitions. Cryptographic hashes change drastically with slight modification
in the content, and therefore, carry no meaningful distance metric for measuring similarity. Storing
the perceptual hashes of the image representations as smart-definitions instead of the SHA256-based
hashes, for instance, can improve performance, generalization, and also reduce disk footprint of the
antivirus softwares.
Table 3 demonstrates the categorization of softwares/malwares based on the visual similarity of
our proposed image representations, while comparing a distance metric based on the dHash [16].
Note that each of the files and the images displayed are different (i.e., have unique SHA256 digests)
although some images or the file names, may look similar.
The generalization capability of dHash, for instance, which is based on the pixel gradients, can
be evidently noted from the Figure 5. This clearly shows a separation of the pair-wise Hamming
distances among the files of the same vs different categories with the grey line representing our
proposed cutoff of 74. Stronger cutoffs on the Hamming distance may be required for FP-sensitive
applications such as malware classification using the perceptual hash-based similarity.
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Table 3: Software categorization based on the images. Note that the images and the
files tabulated below are all distinct with different SHA256 digests. The Hamming
distances are computed with respect to the first row of each category based on
a 192-bit perceptual hash obtained by concatenating the 64-bit dHashes [16]
computed per channel. Last three categories demonstrate malware categorization.
Category Image (scaled) Filename Difference Hash or dHash (192-bit Hex) Hamming
Distance
Adobe Acrobat Reader acrord32-911.exe 631846328c6399ce2a524242229181d5ab5ad52a54ad6a55 0
acrord32-950.exe e1810e38e0c31f4c2a42004042a081d5ab5ad52a56ad6a55 31
acrord32-992.exe 33c1263ee0230fcc0a1e704006bcf9c1cb4a6d2d34b592d2 64
acrord32-918.exe 33c13e3ee0030fec0a3e784106bdf1c1cb4a6d2d34b59252 68
MySQL Database mysqladmin.exe (5.1 MB) 00010000000000810f0783e1f0783c1ec9a92a221656d5d5 0
mysql_embedded.exe (24.1 MB) 81800040000000810f0783c1e0f87c3ead2dad2ab2525559 28
mysqld.exe (37.9 MB) 00000000000000800f07c3e1f0783c1eadad2ca21252d355 15
TeX Typesetting System miktex-luatex.exe a56c4a8b9b92a3ade952f5ac54b13ad42db6464452592cb8 0
miktex-xetex.exe a56c4a8b9b92a3ad697371ac4eb13a942da646445269acb8 13
bg5pdflatex.exe 256c4a8b8b92a9ade95371ac4eb5329429a64644524368b8 20
miktex-bibtex.exe 256c4a8b8b92a92de95371ac46b13a942da64644526328b8 17
Norton Download Managers norton_download_manager-1.exe 31899d0a24d883cc8c3698d95a1965349130056d56960de8 0
nortonn360downloader.exe 31899d4a24d883cc4c3698895a196519b130356dd2d04d6c 20
Continued on next page.
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Bluestacks Android Emulator Bluestacks.exe 282c2b0aaa1a22b223c3d80d652598908655c4526a782ca9 0
BlueStacksTV.exe 282c2b09aa1b20a323c3c80d65659c910655d452e878aca9 15
Installers installer_solmysterystolenpower_es.exe 0280009100000088a545cd99b92a6964926d920db28512ac 0
installer_governorofpokerdeluxe_de.exe 0080009000000088a545cd99b92a6964926d920db285122c 3
Google Updater googleupdate.exe 52b2f645899193130220000000408174d4a9d52a54a8552d 0
googleupdate.exe 52b2f62589931313328000800040104254a9d52a54a855af 19
Windows Updates WindowsServer2003-KB958655.exe 2c2c2622d2d2d999932a4cb64b53a4690603d13578ba2c8f 0
WindowsInstaller-KB893803-v2-x86.exe 2d2c2612d0d1d909932a4cb26b53a4680627c11178fa3c0f 19
Adware.Graftor lollipop_12062228.exe 000000000000000048800000000040925200000181011124 0
lollipop_12140006.exe 000000000000000048800000000040925a04020981050224 8
Backdoor:Win32/Cycbot.G asedsle7 009209910241a0082a810080008100c21a54e0021eb4e183 0
C29.exe 842049a440008249aa01000100810051863cf0020f3cf1c1 42
DPYRAMYMEG-447.pms.exe.SVD 01042182244992012a810001018100d11a54a10a1ed5a183 32
Babylon PUA/Adware MyBabylonTB.exe 0000000000000000a8810081008100d5aa00000000809085 0
Babylon.exe 0000000000000000a1008100810081528a00000000800085 21
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Table 4: 5-Fold cross-validation metrics, and confusion matrices across different FPRs over the OOF
predictions of the trained model.
Validation Training
CV Fold AUC Logloss AUC Logloss
fold1 0.9712 0.3038 0.99 0.0036
fold2 0.9754 0.2889 0.99 0.0038
fold3 0.9716 0.3205 0.99 0.0042
fold4 0.9743 0.3036 0.99 0.0040
fold5 0.9720 0.2948 0.99 0.0050
all OOFs 0.9727 0.3023
TN FN TP FP TPR% FPR%
1411 1125 1137 1 50.27 0.0708
1405 687 1575 7 69.63 0.496
Figure 6: ROC curve over the OOF predictions of the trained XGBoost model.
Recent works on data-driven perceptual hashing algorithms involving deep convolutional siamese
networks with binary output neurons [18–22], that are tailored to the domain of application, promise
further generalization of the hash fingerprints at lower FP rates.
4 Simple Malware Classifier trained on the image pixels
In this section we validate our proposed scheme of mapping the file behavior to the RGB image space
by investigating the efficacy of a simple boosted-tree based model (using the XGBoost package [11])
for malware classification. The model is trained directly over the flattened raw pixels of the image
representation corresponding to the 1,412 clean and 2,262 malicious samples. The model is trained
to minimize the logloss cost function. The hyperparameters † were chosen over a randomized grid
search evaluated by the out-of-fold (OOF) validation AUC score.
The OOF cross-validation scores, ROC curve, and the confusion matrices at different FPRs (where
‘positive’ refers to a conviction and ‘negative’ to an exoneration) of the trained model are summarized
in the Table 4 and Figure 6. The model achieves a TPR of about 50% at a low FP rate of 0.071%
(corresponding to a single FP). The results show that the raw pixels of our image representation
encode significant information across the API call sequence to discriminate between the two classes
(malicious or benign) efficiently.
5 Modeling Malware Behaviors with Generative Adversarial Networks
Generative Adversarial Networks or GANs, first invented by Goodfellow et al. [10] in 2014, are a
class of generative models that approximate the inherent distribution of the input data, based on a
finite sample represented by the training dataset, using backpropagation over a minimax objective
†https://xgboost.readthedocs.io/en/latest/python/python_api.html
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function involving two competing sub-networks — the discriminator and the generator — playing an
adversarial zero-sum game, in an unsupervised setting, iteratively, where the generator minimizes the
predictability of the discriminator in classifying the real from the synthetic data that is generated by
the generator, and, in turn, the discriminator competes by learning on the differences.
The weights of the discriminator network are updated to minimize the loss in the classification of
the fake (generated) from the real samples, whereas, the generator is updated, backpropagating the
discriminator’s error signal, to maximize the classification loss of the discriminator, by generating
fake samples which look more real. Soon the generator is able to sample images highly resembling
the input data while the discriminator saturates to being highly uncertain in classifying them from
the real ones. The trained generator G, capturing the true input distribution, can then be sampled to
interpolate or extrapolate the training data.
GANs, as originally proposed by Goodfellow et al., were limited by major challenges such as training
instability, high sensitivity to network hyperparameters, difficulty in choosing the right learning rates
for the discriminator and the generator (so that neither saturates too fast), in addition to not being
inherently convolutional for modeling image datasets. In 2015, Radford et al. [23] introduced a
deep and convolutional version of the GANs called DC-GANs with improved training stability for
modeling the image datasets, generating realistic synthetic images, with interesting vector arithmetic
in the input noise space that samples the learnt distribution of the generator. However, it still suffered
from problems such as uninterpretable loss function that didn’t always correlate with the quality of
the generated images, sensitivity to network architecture and hyperparameters, etc.
In 2017, Arjovsky et al. [24] proposed an alternative cost function for the GAN that estimates the
Wasserstein distance of the synthetic to the real data distribution under the constraint of weight
clipping, with the discriminator (or the “critic”) predicting a value function instead of the class
labels. They showed that, unlike the previous works, the loss function correlated well with the output
quality of the generated images, in addition to an improved stability of the training. However, using
weight-clipping strongly regularized the model with a high sensitivity to the clipping parameter c,
limiting its capacity in capturing the higher moments of the data distribution, as shown by Gulrajani
et al. in [13] who suggested penalizing the gradient norm instead of clipping the weights. Their
model, referred to as WGAN-GP, drastically improved the training stability across a wide variety of
network architectures, notably also involving also the residual connections [1], with minimal or no
tuning of the GAN hyperparameters. In addition, the modified cost function of the GAN also ensured
that the generator continued improving significantly even after the discriminator neared saturation.
5.1 Training
We trained a WGAN-GP model over the image representation of the malicious file behaviors that
inherently captures the API content along with the sequence of the first-occurrence. Once the
generator is trained to model the distribution of the malicious behavior, one can sample instances that
represent new malware, thereby, emulating a malware author against which a malware classifier may
be tuned, tested, or trained for proactive protection.
Our dataset consisted of 64 × 64 × 3 image representations of 2, 262 distinct malicious samples
(excluding the 250 malicious samples out of the 500 used for mapping the top significant ngrams to
the image frequencies). We divided the set into a 80:20 train:test holdout split to train the WGAN-GP
model on 1, 809 and validate on 453 image representations of distinct malicious samples. A sample
of the training and the validation images used are shown in the Figure 7. The architecture of the
generator and the critic network of the trained WGAN-GP model is summarized in the Figure 8,
that has been one of the many architectures validated by Gulrajani et al. in [13] who demonstrated
competitive results of sample generation quality on the 128× 128× 3 LSUN bedrooms dataset [25].
The critic:generator training iteration ratio is kept at 5 : 1, i.e., for every 5 training iterations of the
critic, the generator is updated once. A default value of λ = 10, as suggested in [13], is used as
the gradient penalty hyperparameter in the WGAN-GP loss function. A batchsize of 64 is used for
computing the gradient update per iteration that is parallelized into batches of 16 training samples
(data parallelisation) across 4 nVIDIA GTX TITAN X GPUs with 12 GB of available memory and
3, 072 CUDA cores each. Adam [26] optimization algorithm was used for training the network with
a learning rate of 0.0001, β1 =0, and β2 =0.9. The synthetic images are sampled from the trained
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(a) Sample of the images used for training. (b) Sample of the images used for validation.
Figure 7: Sample of the image representations of malicious files used for training the WGAN-GP
model.
Figure 8: Architecture of the generator and the critic networks of the WGAN-GP model trained
where the ResidualUpSample and the ResidualDownSample blocks are as defined in the Figures 9a
and 9b, respectively.
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(a) (b)
Figure 9: Architecture of the residual blocks used in the (a) generator, and the (b) critic networks,
respectively.
generator with 128−dimensional noise vector inputs (~z) that are, in turn, sampled from a Gaussian
standard normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance (N (~0,1)) †.
The model trained for about a day across 45, 000 generator iterations with final negative critic losses
(averaged across mini-batches of an epoch) of 0.4262 on the training set, and 1.08365 on the
validation set. Figure 10a describes the training cost (across each iteration) and the validation cost
(for every 10 iterations) of the critic on a minibatch of 64. This shows a stable training run without
any overfitting. The Wasserstein distance estimate converges close to zero consistently across the
training and the validation. Figure 10b shows a sample of 64 synthetic images generated by the
trained generator network G.
5.2 Applications
Proactive Protection against Zero-Day Malwares. The synthetic images sampled from the
learned distribution, interpolating or extrapolating the known dataset, are representative of new
malware behaviors authored by the generator. Such generated samples may be augmented with the
original training datasets and can be used for modeling behavior-based malware classifiers, for pro-
tection against zero-day malicious behaviors that are captured by the trained generator’s distribution.
Malware classifiers that can take such advantage of the synthetic images, needn’t necessarily be based
only on the image representation. As the images may be decoded back to the ngram sequence and the
corresponding term-frequencies that it visually represents, the synthetic images generated, therefore,
can further be used by other behavioral event-based rules, signatures and ML applications.
Interpreting the Synthetic Samples. The synthetic images sampled from the learned distribution
may be interpreted for further analysis by decoding them back to the corresponding ngram sequence
and the relative term-frequencies, as demonstrated in the Figure 11. Ability to have such a decompo-
sition offers the advantage of analyzing malicious behaviors that have not yet been observed in-field
but are a part of the current threat distribution or trend captured by the generator. These decoded
sequences may further be used to define behavior-based string-signatures, or augment the training
sets of general behavior-based malware classifiers, as discussed above.
Testing and Tuning Malware Classifiers. Behavior-based malware classifiers may be tuned or
tested against the trained generator that takes the role of a malware emulator in synthesizing new
†Network architecture and the hyperparameters of the model were chosen out of those evaluated by Gulrajani
et al. on the LSUN bedrooms dataset in [13].
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(a) The negative critic loss of the model converging towards a minimum as the network trains. The images used
for validation are from a different set of executables not included in the training set.
(b) Generated sample of synthetic images from the trained generator after 45,000 generator iterations. (Images
shown are scaled.)
Figure 10: Training metrics, and sample generated images of the WGAN-GP model trained on the
malicious image dataset.
malicious behavior, similar to the advantage that the malware authors have been having in being able
to test their malicious payload against security softwares at their disposal.
Generating Malware Hybrids with Vector Arithmetic. Radford et al. [23] first showed that the
input space of the noise vectors modeled the semantic information of the final generated images
in subtle ways that enabled the manipulation of the visual artifacts of the generated image with
simple vector arithmetic of the inputs. Specifically, they showed, that manipulating the input noise
vectors corresponding to the output images of men with glasses, by intuitive vector arithmetic,
gave resultant vectors that sampled images consisting of women with glasses, when fed through the
generatorG trained on a dataset of human faces. They showed that the image output ofG(~zman,glasses−
~zman,no glasses+~zwoman,no glasses) resembled that of a woman with glasses. But, a similar arithmetic in the
pixel-space, given by G(~zman,glasses)−G(~zman,no glasses) +G(~zwoman,no glasses), produced blurry images
with all the semantic features of a face washed out. This suggests that the input noise space models the
structure of the underlying data in a way, that when combined under an arithmetic operation, samples
an image with a combination of specific semantic artifacts (such as the smile, complexion, wearing
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Figure 11: Interpreting the synthetic malware by decoding the generated image representation into
a sequence of the first-occurrence of the ngram words along with their corresponding relative (sub-
linear) term-frequencies with respect to the highest frequent ngram per channel whose tf is normalized
to 1. For the demonstration above, n = 4 (Red channel) is chosen. A similar decomposition may be
obtained for 1,2-grams or 3-grams corresponding to the Blue or the Green channels, respectively, as
discussed in Section 2.3. (Images shown are scaled.)
spectacles etc) while preserving the overall high-level semantics. That is, the resultant generated
images from input vectors created through such arithmetic operations, still looked like a face.
This further suggests that such arithmetic in the noise vector space of malware image representations,
may be exploited to combine behavioral features across malwares, such as, for instance, the event
of adding an entry to the registry, frequent disk I/O calls infecting good files, using power shell to
connect remotely, etc., such that the resultant represents a hybrid malware that is coherently combined
to still retain the malicious semantics. Figure 12 demonstrates an example of a simple arithmetic of
combining four malwares (those in Figure 11) in the input noise vector space and the pixel space,
highlighting the differences in terms of the decoded sequences of 4-grams with the corresponding
relative term-frequencies.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we demonstrated a novel way of representing dynamic file behavior of an executable
in the image-space for effective visualization, and with applications of easy manual/automatic
software and malware categorization. The raw pixels of the image representation were shown to
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Figure 12: Comparing the averages of the malware images in the pixel-domain and the input noise
vector space. We propose a novel method of generating hybrid malwares from a set of generated
malwares based on noise vector arithmetic on visual concepts, first demonstrated by Radford et al.
[23] on a dataset of human faces. (Images shown are scaled.)
encode significant information to efficiently classify malwares from clean files using boosted-trees.
Additionally, the image representation was shown to be compatible across deep learning architectures
(generative or discriminative) involving the convolution filter maps. Finally, we described the
applications of GANs in modeling the distribution of malicious behaviors, and in creating new and
hybrid malware image representations, that could be decoded to the individual API call information
and the first-invocation sequence, for proactive protection.
Future works may include research on incorporating the arguments and the DLL information of
the API calls into the images, comparing the results presented in this paper, for possible efficacy
improvements. Another possible research direction includes modeling the malware behaviors directly
over the API call sequences using Sequence GANs [27]. Sequence GANs are currently at a nascent
state in terms of training stability and sequence generation quality. One may also experiment with the
other families of GANs such as the conditional GANs [28] that exploit the class labels (malicious or
clean) in modeling the class-conditional distributions of the input data.
Also, the vector arithmetic heuristic proposed over the image representations of the malware behaviors,
for combining malwares, is only easy to formulate, given the vector components capture different
recognizable unique strains of the input distribution. That is, each component models a unique
semantic aspect of the malicious behavior. The InfoGAN [29] architecture helps to achieve the above
by creating a disentangled representation of the semantic aspects, using an augmented set of inputs
(called latent code) which, unlike the WGAN-GP model, can be used to deterministically tweak the
resultant malware hybrid.
We hope our work inspires further research into bridging the gap in security with the state-of-the-art
deep learning technologies for an end-to-end intelligent proactive protection against unseen and
unknown threats.
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